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Japan at the Summit 
(QHUJ\&OLPDWH&KDQJHDQGDµ*DJJOHRI*V¶ 
 
Abstract 
This paper focuses on how energy issues and climate change are addressed at the multilateral 
level, specifically by the Group of 8 (G8) and Group of 20 (G20). It will trace the 
development, trajectory, successes and failures of global summitry in addressing these issues. 
,QDGGLWLRQLWZLOOH[SORUH-DSDQ¶VFRQWULEXWLRQVWRWKHVHSURFHVVHVDVZHOODVLWVPRWLYDWLRQV 
 
1 Introduction 
This paper shifts the focus of our discussion of energy issues and climate change to the 
international and, in particular, multilateral level. It will specifically highlight the role of the 
Group of 8 (G8) and Group of 20 (G20), alongside a number of other alphanumeric 
configurations collectively known DV*;VXPPLWU\RUDµ*DJJOHRI*V¶LQ shaping and 
promoting multilateral approaches to these challenges. The G8 and G20 summits may not 
immediately spring to mind as the multilateral mechanisms charged with managing and 
SXVKLQJIRUZDUGWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\¶VDJHQGDRQ energy issues and climate change. 
This is largely because both have been written about chiefly in the context of global 
economic governance, and in terms of tectonic shifts in the global order and the latter 
replacing the former. However, in fact both groupings have a great deal in common in 
addressing these issues. Both were, inter alia, originally crisis-triggered responses tasked with 
stabilizing and managing the global economy. Both have also experienced a degree of 
µPLVVLRQFUHHS¶E\ZKLFKHQHUJ\DQGWKH environment have found a regular place on the 
summitV¶DJHQGD7KXVDVD result of their inherent and shared nature, both groups have over 
time and to varying degrees engaged with these issues either explicitly or implicitly.  
 
In this light, this paper will trace the development, trajectory, successes and failures of GX 
summitry in addressing these issues. In addition, it will H[SORUH-DSDQ¶VUROHLQDQG
contributions to these processes since the first meeting of the G8 leaders ± or G6 as it was 
then1 ± in 1975 and the first meeting of the G20 leaders in 2008, highlighting successes and 
failures along the way. In conclusion, the paper will add to the discussion of what Japan has 
done by explaining why. By its very nature, an exploration of global summitry, and 
SDUWLFXODUO\WKHµVRIWHU¶PRUHLQIRUPDOJDWKHULQgs like the G8 and G20, tends towards the 
state-centric as a result of the central role of leaders and the informal relationships they 
construct that define these groups from more formal and legalistic international organizations. 
However, this analysis seeks to supplement this approach by highlighting the norms that 
Constructivists and English School scholars of International Relations would argue lie at the 
KHDUWRIWKHDQ\VWDWH¶VPRWLYDWLRQVDQG resulting behaviour in global summitry. Finally, the 
conclusion will also point to recent and countervailing developments under the current prime 
PLQLVWHUVKLSRI$EH6KLQ]ǀ 
 
7KHµ*DJJOHRI*V¶DQG-DSDQ 
                                                          
1
 The original G6 of France, the US, the UK, Germany, Japan and Italy became a G7 in 1976 with the addition of 
Canada. EU representation was added the following year. Russia went through a series of different statuses 
through the 1990s before becoming a full member in 1998 of what we understand today to be the G8. In 
March 2014, Russia was removed from the G8 as a result of the crisis in Ukraine with its future within the 
group still unclear at the time of writing. For the sake of clarity, the alphanumeric term specific to the period 
under discussion will be used, and where appropriate G8 will be used as a blanket term throughout this paper. 
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The G8 finds its origins in the informal mechanisms established by the finance ministers of 
the developed world in the early 1970s to manage the macroeconomic challenges of the time. 
These informal mechanisms were VRRQXSJUDGHGWRWKHOHDGHUV¶OHYHODWWKHILUVWPHHWLQJRI
Group of 6 (G6) leaders of the leading economies in the Chateau of Rambouillet in 
November 1975. There was no intention to hold a second summit but the utility of this forum 
for discussion amongst like-minded leaders in deciding the direction and steering the global 
economy was clear when a second summit was held the following year in San Juan. 
Thereafter, the summit process steadily evolved in terms of membership and agenda items to 
become the forum we know today as the G8, which met most recently in Loch Erne, Northern 
Ireland in June 2013. The G8 was scheduled to meet in Sochi, Russia in June 2014 but in 
reaction to the Ukrainian Crisis the G7 boycotted the summit, temporarily removed Russia 
from the group and met as a G7 in Brussels. 
 
6LPLODUO\WKH*¶VEULHIHUDQGPRUHUHFHQWJHQHVLVIROORZVDVLPLODU trajectory. Originally 
convened as a meeting of the finance ministers of WKHZRUOG¶VGHYHORSHGDQGUDSLGO\
developing major economies in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis of the late-1990s, 
it went about its business from 1999 largely overlooked. However, in reaction to the global 
financial and economic crisis that began in 2008, the G8 was found to be both 
unrepresentative and ineffective. Thus, in its place, the G20 was upgraded to a meeting of 
leaders and met for the first time in November 2008 
in Washington. Similarly concerned with predominantly macroeconomic issues, its agenda, 
alongside membership and hosting evolved organically. By 2011, the dust had settled to the 
extent that the G20 met annually and a future schedule of hosts had been decided. 
 
,QLWLDOSUHGLFWLRQVRIWKH*¶VLnevitable decline and the rise of a more (supposedly) 
representative and effective G20 proved to be wide of the mark (Bradford and Linn 2004; 
Foresti and Wild 2009).2 Instead, a settlement of sorts has emerged whereby the G8 has 
continued to meet (usually in the late Spring/early Summer) to deal with security and political 
issues, whereas the G20 meets later in the year and addresses financial and economic issues. 
However, both Gs share a similar format in that these are informal bodies with no legal basis 
to exist and no constitution or charter. They rely on the willingness of leaders to come 
together and forge common responses to common challenges and then use their collective 
moral authority to ensure compliance. Equally, the agenda of both fora are flexible, moveable 
feasts and can be shaped by the demands of the external environment or an individual leader. 
Thus, as will be explored in the following two sections, both the G8 and the G20 have over 
time either explicitly or implicitly addressed energy issues and climate change. Before, we 
turn to this, the Japanese perspective on, and role in, these developments in the architecture of 
global governance require some brief explanation. 
 
The G8 has traditionally mattered to Japan and the reasons for this are straightforward and 
uncontested. In other, more traditional, mechanisms of global governance, Japan has been 
UHJDUGHGDVDµODWHFRPHU¶7KLVFDQ be seen in the case of the United Nations (UN), 
International Monetary Fund, World Bank and Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, in all of which Japan was initially excluded and came to regard eventual 
admission as symbolic of postwar recognition and reintegration into international society. In 
contrast, Japanese prime minister Miki Takeo was an original participant in the Rambouillet 
                                                          
2
 The G8 represents roughly 50% of global economic output, two-thirds of international trade but only 14% of 
ƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?/ŶĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ?ƚŚĞ' ? ?ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐ ? ?йŽĨŐůŽďĂůĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŽƵƚƉƵƚ ? ? ?йŽĨŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
trade and two-ƚŚŝƌĚƐŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝon (The World Bank 2014). 
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summit. In addition, Japan isthe only non-North American, non-European member of this 
self-appointed elite. As a result, Japan has forged two identities and roles in the G8 over time 
± that of bridge (kakehashi) between East and West, in addition to the representative of Asia 
$MLDQRGDLK\ǀ  
 
The rise of the G20 not only places the continued existence of the G8 under threat (although 
so far these doubts have been unwarranted), but also expands the number of seats at the top 
table of global summitry available to Asian countries. Australia, China, India, Indonesia and 
South Korea are all now represented alongside Japan, thus diluting the need for a regional 
representative and raising questions of whether Asia should caucus to achieve common goals. 
The JapanHVHJRYHUQPHQW¶VUHVSRQVHWR this has been confused and contradictory at times. On 
the one hand, the Japanese government has sought to secure the success of the G20 as a true 
believer in multilateralism and internationalism, but its efforts have been half-hearted insofar 
as the Japanese government does not want the G20 to succeed at the expense of the G8 ± a 
position that alienates Japan from some of its G8 colleagues. Equally, the Japanese 
government has encountered difficulties in terms of continuing to play the role of Asian 
representative and instead has at times engaged in competition with the new Asian additions 
WRWKH*'REVRQD6RPXFKIRU-DSDQ¶VUHVSRQVH to the changes in the global 
balance of power and their impact upon the architecture of global governance, a subject to 
which we shall return in WKH&RQFOXVLRQ/HWXVQRZWXUQWRWKH*¶VDQG*¶VWUHDWPHQWRI
energy issues and climate change.  
 
7KH*¶VUROHLQHQHUJ\LVVXHVDQGFOLPDWHFKDQJH 
As mentioned above, the G8 was originally conceived as an informal grouping of like-
minded leaders with the goal of discussing and reaching a consensus on how to address 
macroeconomic issues of the day. In the first half of the 1970s these discussions were driven 
by the chaos caused by the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the sudden rise in oil 
prices instigated by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Thus, at a time of oil 
shortages and price hikes resulting from the 1973 and 1979 energy crises, it was not long 
EHIRUHWKH*¶s discussion turned from the pressing issues of the day such as promoting free 
trade and non-inflationary growth, to the issue of oil consumption. The G8 Research Group 
of the University of Toronto has counted the words in G8 summits dedicated to the topic of 
energy and however blunt this bean-counting measurement may be, it does show that energy 
has been a constant theme in G8 summits from 1975 (G8 Research Group 2010). This 
discussion spiked for the first time at the 1979 Tokyo Summit, the first to be hosted in Asia, 
when 62% of the summit declaration was given over to the topic. As will be discussed in 
Section 5, this provided an opportunity for Japan to demonstrate leadership.  
 
7KH7RN\R6XPPLWZDVGXEEHGWKHµHQHUJ\VXPPLW¶DWWKHWLPHDQG resulted in an 
eleventh-hour agreement RQ*PHPEHUV¶HQHUJ\FRQVXPSWion by which the leaders agreed 
to country-by-country targets through to 1985. US levels of consumption would be limited 
through to 1985 to the 1977 levels of 8.5 million barrels per day. The EC was to restrict its 
consumption to the 1978 levels from 1980 through to 1985. In the case of Japan its oil 
consumption would be limited to 1979 levels for 1980 ± 5.4 million barrels per day ± and 
then somewhere in the region of 6.3 to 6.9 million barrels of oil per day through to 1985. At 
the same time, the Japanese government pledged to meet a growth rate of 5.7% from 1980 as 
special dispensation for conceding on the oil issue. This momentum continued the following 
year at the 1980 Venice Summit where the G7 leaders added a number of concrete measures 
to conserve oil use and sought to «rely on fuels other than oil to meet the energy needs of 
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future economic growth» (G7 1980). Although these agreements may have created some 
short-term stabilization, these targets were never met.  
Thereafter, energy issues broadly defined appeared annually on the summit agenda of G8 
leaders, although they have not received the same attention as at the time of the 1979 oil 
shock (G8 Research Group 2010). Depth in GX summitry has also been in evidence over 
time with ministerial meetings VXSSRUWLQJWKHOHDGHUV¶GLVFXVVLRQ7KH*HQHUJ\PLQLVWHUV
met as early as 1979 after the Tokyo Summit of that year, although this has since proved to 
be a one off. In contrast, G8 energy ministers have met since 1998 in Moscow albeit on an 
irregular basis with the last time being in 2009 in Rome.  
 
As regards nuclear energy, although it has received treatment at previous summits, the 2011 
Deauville Summit provides a clear demonstration of the nature of summitry. Ahead of the 
summit and in response to Fukushima, G7 central banks jointly intervened in the currency 
markets (the first time LQDGHFDGHWRVWDELOL]HWKHYDOXHRIWKH\HQDQG-DSDQ¶VH[SRUWV$W
the actual summit, the discussion topic of «Solidarity with Japan», which included both 
expressions of sympathy alongside reassurances as regards nuclear safety, was shifted to the 
headline issue on the first day of the summit. This makes clear not only the sense of fraternity 
that exists amongst the G8 leaders and comes to the fore in a time of crisis (exactly the same 
thing happened in 2005 in response to the London bombings whilst the G8 leaders met in 
Gleneagles), but also the flexible nature of summitry that allows an immediate issue to be 
pushed up its agenda. 
 
$VUHJDUGVWKH*¶VWUHDWPHQWRIFOLPDWHFKDQJHWKHHQYLURQPHQWILUVW 
appeared as a topic for summit discussion at the 1985 Bonn Summit at the instigation of 
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. The Economic Declaration that emerged from the summit 
dedicated 217 words to the topic by which the leaders pledged to coordinate initiatives 
through existing international organizations such as the OECD (G7 1985). Thereafter, the 
topic appeared in summit discussions with enough regularity that it could be regarded as 
a traditional summit subject. As a result of a French initiative at the 1989 Paris Summit, a 
1,700-word section on the environment was included in the resulting Economic Declaration 
by which G7 leaders pledge to explore how environmental protection could be inputted into 
individual government policies (G7 1989). The deepening of the summit process was also in 
evidence when the environment ministers of the G7, independent of and in addition to its 
leaders, came together for the first time in Spring 1992 in Germany and met annually from 
1994 onwards. At the 2005 Gleneagles Summit, climate change took second place to African 
poverty in the meGLD¶VDWWHQWLRQEXWLWZDVVWLOOWKHIRFXVIRUPXFKGLVFXVVLRQDOWKRXJKOLWWOH 
progress was made in the face of US intransigence on the Kyoto Protocol. This was obvious 
WRDOOLQ8.SULPHPLQLVWHU7RQ\%ODLU¶VVXPPDU\RIWKH summit: «[t]hose of us who have 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol remain committed to it, and will continue to work to make it a 
success». The only point of agreement amongst the summit leaders was «that climate change 
is happening now, that human activity is contributing to it, and that it could affect every part 
of the globe» (G8 2005).  
 
Climate change became the dominant and emblematic theme of two 
subsequent summits, the German-hosted Heiligendamm Summit of 2007 and the Japan-
hRVWHG7ǀ\DNR6XPPLWRI008. At the former, German ChanFHOORU$QJHOD0HUNHO¶VILUVW
summit as host, the G8 leaders declared that: 
 
[i]n setting a global goal for emissions reductions in the process we have agreed in 
Heiligendamm involving all major emitters, we will consider seriously the decisions 
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made by the European Union, Canada and Japan which include at least a halving of 
global emissions by 2050. We have agreed that the UN climate process is the 
appropriate forum for negotiating future global action on climate change. (G8 2007)  
 
The momentum created at Heiligendamm was maintained partly a result of prime minister 
)XNXGD<DVXRSODFLQJLWRQWKHDJHQGDRIWKH7ǀ\DNR Summit at a very early stage when he 
spoke at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2008. This was then promoted in 
the media as the «Fukuda Vision» centred on pledging to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 
60% to 80% by 2050 from current levels, although prospects of having this adopted by his 
fellow summiteers were bleak ± even more so as regards the adoption of any mid-term targets 
for 2020. Inviting a number of developing countries and major emitters to participate in the 
discussions DW7ǀ\DNRZDVDQHFHVVDU\VWHSEXWDOVRPDGHWKHFKDQFHVRIUHDFKLQJDQ\ 
agreement even slimmer. 
 
Eventually, a commitment was made to achieving at least 50% reduction in emissions by 
2050: 
 
We seek to share with all Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) the vision of, and together with them to consider and 
adopt in the UNFCCC negotiations, the goal of achieving at least 50% reduction of 
global emissions by 2050, recognizing that this global challenge can only be met by a 
global response, in particular, by the contributions from all major economies, 
consistent with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities (G8 2008). 
 
Comparing this with the statement made at Heiligendamm, incremental progress is clear from 
µVHULRXVFRQVLGHUDWLRQ¶WRDFWXDODFWLRQDQGWDUJHWV However, the language used in summit 
statements is notoriously vague and WHQGVWREHWKHUHVXOWRIFRPSURPLVHVRZKDWµVHHNDQG
VKDUH¶µFRQVLGHU DQGDGRSW¶FRQFUHWHO\ amounted to was unclear. What is more, there was 
some disparity between the English and Japanese translations of the above declaration with a 
stronger and clearer commitment implied in the Japanese version (MOFA 2008a). Equally, 
there was no agreement on mid-term targets or consensus on baseline years and it is 
debatable how committed G8 (or whatever forum may still be meeting) leaders will be to 
agreements made 42 years previously. On the plus side of the ledger, the US agreed for the 
first WLPHDW7ǀ\DNR to concrete targets to cut emissions. In addition, the incremental and 
iterative fashion in which the G8 functions is clear: the leaders shifted from agreeing in 2007 
to seriously consider a 50% cut by 2050 to pledging a year later to promote the initiative 
within the UNFCCC negotiations. Another important aspect of these statements is the 
reference to the United Nations. The G8 leaders knowing the extent of their influence and 
abilities, instead recognized and reinforced the UNFCCC as the most appropriate and 
effective mechanism for addressing a global problem of this nature. So, all in all, this summit 
KDVEHHQGXEEHGµDFXUDWH¶VHJJ¶LQWKDW its outcomes were good in parts (Dobson 2008), but 
this characterization DOVRFDSWXUHVWKH*¶VWUHDWPHQWRIERWKissues over time. 
 
7KH*¶VUROHLQHQHUJ\LVVXHVDQGFOLPDWHFKDQJH 
7XUQLQJWRWKH*¶VHQJDJHPHQWZLWKHQHUJ\LVVXHVDQGFOLPDWHFKDQJH it has obviously not 
benefitted from same length of time as the G8 to create momentum and even a legacy in these 
policy areas. Since its first meeting in Washington in November 2008, the G20 has met a 
further VHYHQWLPHVDWWKHOHDGHUV¶OHYHO/RQGon, April 2009; Pittsburgh, September 2009, 
Toronto, June 2010; Seoul, November 2010; Cannes, November 2011; Los Cabos, June 
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2012; and Saint Petersburg, September 2013. There has been no evidence of institutional 
depth in terms of creating G20 ministerial meetings to address these issues. Nevertheless, 
even at its first gathering, the G20 experienced the mission creep in its agenda similar to that 
experienced by the G8 in its early years. As a result, the G20 has been tasked with a range of 
issues in addition to its original financial and macroeconomic focus of which energy issues 
and climate change are but two. 
 
As regards energy, G20 statements reveal an increasing level of engagement with energy 
issues starting from minimal discussion at Washington: 
 
We remain committed to addressing other critical challenges such as energy security 
and climate change, food security, the rule of law, and the fight against terrorism, 
poverty and disease. (G20 2008) 
 
At the second London Summit there were no references to energy. However, at Pittsburgh 
later that year numerous statements accounting for over 10% of summit documentation were 
given over to highlighting issues such as energy efficiency, clean energy and energy security. 
,QWKH7RURQWR6XPPLW¶VWUHDWPHQWZDVQRWVRVXVWDLQHGDQGLW dedicated a single 
paragraph to energy: 
 
We note with appreciation the report on energy subsidies from the International 
Energy Agency (IEA), Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 
OECD and World Bank. We welcome the work of Finance and Energy Ministers in 
delivering implementation strategies and timeframes, based on national circumstances, 
for the rationalization and phase out over the medium term of inefficient fossil fuel 
subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption, taking into account vulnerable groups 
and their development needs. We also encourage continued and full implementation 
of country-specific strategies and will continue to review progress towards this 
commitment at upcoming summits (G20 2010c). 
 
Later in the same year, the Seoul Summit Leaders Declaration included no mention of energy 
issues but the accompanying Seoul Summit Document dedicated a section that covered 
commitments to phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, strategies to contain volatility in 
fossil fuel prices, in addition to welcoming and encouraging the progress of «the Global 
Marine Environment Protection (GMEP) initiative toward the goal of sharing best practices 
to protect the marine environment, to prevent accidents related to offshore exploration and 
development, as well as marine transportation, and to deal with their consequences» (G20 
2010b). 
 
Although the 2011 Cannes Summit was pretty much hijacked by the Eurozone crisis, sections 
in its various declarations and statements were dedicated to the promotion of clean energy 
and the smooth functioning of energy markets to avoid price volatility and ensure energy 
efficiency. It tasked the G20 finance ministers to press ahead with reforms and report back a 
year later. A year later and the Los Cabos Summit reiterated the declarations made at Cannes 
and tasked its finance ministers to take concrete measures in future discussions. 
 
The statement issued at Saint Petersburg in 2013 dedicated a section to the issue and 
reiterated pledges to enhance energy cooperation, ensure the accuracy of energy market data 
and promote cleaner and more efficient energy technologies. 
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To cut a long story short, the G20 has essentially sought to play the role that GX summitry 
can play best, as a steering committee. However, expectations are naturally high ahead of the 
Australian Presidency of the G20in 2014 that it can play a greater leadership role. 
 
A regards climate change, a number of civil society groups have targeted the G20 in an 
attempt to shift its attention away from a narrow focus on economic growth and ensure that 
any consensus includes consideration for climate change. In addition, it is the richest 
countries represented at the G20 that are responsible for the majority of emissions so there is 
a rationale IRUWKH*WRDGGFOLPDWHFKDQJHWRLWVDJHQGD+RZHYHUWKH*¶VUROHLV only 
ever going to be that of catalyst and ultimately it will be the UN that is the legitimate body to 
deal with the issue. The best a GX summit can do on any issue is overcome deadlock and 
create a consensus that then needs to spill over into the more legitimate and legal bodies of 
global governance. At a time when UN negotiations have stalled, this provides an appropriate 
opportunity for the G20 to step in. 
 
Take, for example, the financial transaction tax (FTT, or more popularly the Robin Hood tax) 
that has been mooted as a measure that could generate the billions of dollars needed to addres 
issues such as climate change DQGSRYHUW\7KHVHWD[HVKDYHIRXQGWKHLUZD\RQWRWKH*¶V
agenda and a surprising degree of consensus has even emerged with Argentina, France, 
Germany, South Africa, Spain, and the EU all in favour. Statements by former foreign 
ministers Okada Katsuya and Maehara Seiji during 2010 expressed for the issue and at the 
2011 Cannes Summit Japanese prime minister Noda Yoshihiko even expressed interest in 
exploring the measure further. However, UK prime minister David Cameron has opposed a 
measure that would damage the City of London. 
 
However, for a number of years, G20 summits were dominated, and their agenda hijacked, by 
the crisis in the Eurozone. Partly as a result, at its most recent meeting in Saint Petersburg, 
the G20 simply repeated the anodyne statements that tend to dominate summit documentation 
by declaring that:  
Climate change will continue to have a significant impact on the world economy, and 
cost will be higher to the extent we delay additional actions. We reiterate our 
commitment to fight climate change and welcome the outcome of the 18th conference 
of the Parties to the UN climate change conferences. We are committed to a full 
implementation of the outcomes of Cancun, Durban and Doha and will work with 
Poland as the incoming presidency towards achieving a successful outcome at COP-
19. We are committed to support the full implementation of the agreed outcomes 
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its ongoing 
of the United Nations to mobilize political will through 2014 towards the successful 
adoption of a protocol, another legal instrument, or an agreed outcome with legal 
force under the convention applicable to all Parties by 2015, during COP-21 that 
France stands ready to host (G20 2013). 
 
In effect the G20 was kicking the issue into the long grass and leaving it to others to attempt 
(and fail) to make progress. 
 
-DSDQ¶VUROHDQGFRQWULEXWLRQ 
As would be expected in these mechanisms of global governance that stress the collective 
leadership that presidents, prime ministers and chancellors provide, it is the Japanese prime 
minister that has occupied the central role. However, he is not alone and the role of the sherpa 
as personal assistant should not be overlooked as well as the contribution of various 
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ministries, particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but also the Ministry of Finance and 
others on occasion. 
 
With these actors in mind, and despite some of the weaknesses associated with them in the 
FRQWH[WRILQIRUPDOVXPPLWU\-DSDQ¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWR these developments has at times been 
both significant and multifaceted. Starting with the 1979 Tokyo Summit, although he 
described feeling «naked-like a little child» after the suPPLWSULPHPLQLVWHUƿKLUD
Masayoshi played a central role in ensuring the success of the summit generally and 
specifically with regard to reaching the agreement outlined above amongst fellow summiteers 
on oil consumption (Putnam and Bayne 1987, p. 257). At a relatively early stage, according 
to an article in Japan Times on 1 June, ƿKLUDSODFHGHQHUJ\DQG23(&¶VVXGGHQUDLVLQJRIRLO
prices at the top of the summit agenda. The fact that this would be a divisive issue between 
the United States and Europe was well known and as reported in Japan Times on 7 June, 
*HUPDQ&KDQFHOORU+HOPXW6FKPLGWZHQWDVIDUDVWRDVNƿKLUD to act as a middle man ± a 
role that Japan has played on occasions through the history of GX summitry. The reactions to 
the summit outcomes and the eleventh-hour agreement on oil consumption targets were 
largely positive ZLWKWKH-DSDQ&RPPXQLVW3DUW\WKHORQHYRLFHFULWLFDORIƿKLUD$FFRUG- 
ing to a Yomiuri Shinbun article published on 1 July 1979, the approval rating for his 
administration was in fact bolstered by the summit rising from 37.6% beforehand to 39% 
after the summit. Nicholas Bayne, doyen of summit watchers and summit grader, the Tokyo 
Summit of 1979 received one of the more successful G7/8 summits with a grade of B plus. 
Energy isVXHVIHDWXUHGSUHGRPLQDQWO\RQWKHDJHQGDRIWKHIROORZLQJ\HDU¶VVXPPLW the first 
Venice Summit. However, Japan was prevented from following up on the diplomatic success 
RIWKH7RN\R6XPPLWZKHQƿKLUDSDVVHGDZD\ on 12 June 1980 ten days before the summit 
was due to begin. 
 
Moving forward in time to another Japan-KRVWHGVXPPLWWKH7ǀ\DNR Summit of 2008, other 
significant contributions can be seen in the role played by the Japanese prime minister of the 
day, Fukuda Yasuo, aided by KLVVKHUSD.ǀQR0DVDKDUX)XNXGDH[SUHVVHGKLVGHVLUHWR
work with the rising powers not included within the G8 and One of the original develop- 
ments of the summit was the creation by the Japanese hosts of space and time for the G8 and 
G5 (Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa) to meet separately and together before 
then being joined by Australia, Indonesia and South Korea on the final day of the summit as a 
Major Economies Forum (MEF), or G16, to discuss climate change. Thereafter, Japan was 
active in creating the consensus that this forum had a role to play and should continue, 
particularly in shaping the debate on climate change within the UN and this innovation in 
global summitry was adopted at the following \HDU¶VVXPPLWLQ/¶$TXLOD'REVRQD
+RZHYHU-DSDQ¶VFRQWULEXWLRQ appears to be largely in the area of global governance 
architecture and DVUHJDUGVWKH7ǀ\DNR6XPPLW¶VVWDWHPHQWRQFOLPDWHFKDQJHPHQtioned 
above in Section 3, the reaction of summit watchers was for the most part one of confusion. 
 
It is worth mentioning that Japan also hosted the Tokyo International Conference on African 
Development (TICAD-,9SULRUWRWKH7ǀ\DNR6XPmit and sought to create synergy between 
the two (although chiefly with the goal of ensuring the success of the G8 agenda on climate 
change rather than African development (Dobson 2012b). The Yokohama Declaration that 
resulted from TICAD-IV stated that:  
 
African countries appreciated JaSDQ¶V©&RRO(DUWK3URPRWLRQ3URgramme» and 
DFNQRZOHGJHG-DSDQ¶VHIIRUWVLQVHHNLQJWRGHYHORSDQ international framework 
looking beyond the first steps taken in the current Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gas 
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emissions. In this regard, the Participants welcomed the announcement by the 
Government of Japan, in January 2008, of its intention to establish a «Cool Earth 
Partnership» with US$10 billion Financial Mechanism on the basis of policy 
consultations between Japan and developing countries ± including African countries ± 
to address the effects of climate change and to modernize their industries, by way of 
technology-transfer, to render them more energy-efficient and more environment-
friendly (MOFA 2008b). 
 
Considering that original drafts of the declaration had included considerably stronger phrases 
OLNHµODXGHG¶DQGµVXSSRUWHG¶UDWKHUWKDQµDSSUHFLDWHG¶DQGµDFNQRZOHGJHG¶WKLVLVKDUGO\D
ULQJLQJHQGRUVHPHQWRI-DSDQ¶V initiative. 
 
$QRWKHUPHDVXUHRI-DSDQ¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKH*¶VWUHDWPHQWRf the climate change and 
energy issues is the level of compliance with commitments made at each summit. The G8 
Research Group at the University of Toronto has tracked many of these commitments over 
time. As regards the *¶VFRPPLWPHQWVRQFOLPDWHFKDQJHEHWZHHQDQG-DSDQ
posts the highest compliance score of 79% with Germany on 74% and 52% as the average 
level of compliance amongst G8 countries (Kirton 2007, pp. 22-23). As regards energy, the 
average level of G8 compliance with commitments made between 1996 and 2005 is 61% but 
Japan finds itself towards the foot of the rankings with a compliance score of 50%. 
 
$VUHJDUGVWKH*¶VWUHDWPHQWRIWKH)77PHQWLRQHGDERYH-DSDQ¶s response has been 
vague at best. As reported in Japan Times on 1 November 2011, Japanese civil society 
organizations are in favour of the tax and petitioned Noda stressing that a 0.005% tax on 
currency transactions could raise more than 600 billion yen a year and be used as part of the 
3/11 recovery. In contrast, business organisations, like Nippon Keidanren, have been against 
it (Nippon Keidanren 2010). Japan had previously scrapped a similar tax but as regards the 
FTT, little consensus within the GOJ has existed. However it did appear to have been gaining 
ground within the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) before its landslide defeat in the 2012 
election. According to Okubo Tsutomu, head of the committee in charge of fiscal and 
PRQHWDU\LVVXHVZLWKLQWKH'3-¶VSROLF\FRXQFLOLQOLJKWRIWKHrise in the value of the yen, 
and the chances of the success of strategies such as intervention in the currency markets, the 
possibility of a FTT needed be considered. Moreover, if Europe were to introduce such a tax 
then Japan would need to follow suit to avoid the inevitable flight to the yen (Ito 2011). 
Finally, this may appear attractive to Japan as a means of also financing the commitment 
made at the 2008 TICAD-IV to double aid to Africa. 
 
Finally, the G20 Research Group has also tracked G20 compliance scores and in February 
ZDVDEOHWRUHSRUWRQWKH*¶VPRVWUHFHQWSURJUHVV in reaching its goals on 
development. Included in these commitments is the issue of energy efficiency, for which 
Japan demonstrated full compliance so far with the 2010 Seoul 6XPPLW¶VSOHGJHWKDW©ZH
will take steps to create, as appropriate, the enabling environments that are conducive to the 
development and deployment of energy efficiency and clean energy technologies, including 
policies and practices in our countries and beyond, including technical transfer and capacity 
building» and the 2011 Cannes 6XPPLW¶VFRPPLWPHQWWR©VXSSRUWWKHGHSOR\PHQWRIFOHDQ
energy and energy efficiency (C3E) technologies». Japan was seen to have taken steps to 
create the enabling environments that are conducive to the development and deployment of 
energy efficiency and clean energy technologies both at home and in other countries, 
specifically in the Asia Pacific and North Africa. 
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6 Conclusion 
So much for what GX summitry and in particular Japan have done, or not as the case may be. 
In conclusion, the paper will discuss the underlying PRWLYDWLRQVEHKLQG-DSDQ¶VEHKDYLRXU$
range of different theoretical approaches will inevitably highlight different pushes and pulls. 
A traditionally Realist appURDFKZRXOGH[SODLQ)XNXGD¶VYDULRXVLQLWLDWLYHVWKURXJKWKH 
lens of undiluted national interest. For example, the creation of the MEF would be regarded 
simply as an attempt on the part of Japan to dilute the role of the G5 and the central role of 
China. Equally, the countries that the MEF initiative embraced ± Australia, Indonesia and 
South Korea ± were VRPHRIWKHPRVWYRFDOO\VXSSRUWLYHRI)XNXGD¶V©&RRO(DUWKªLQLWLDWLYH
to halve global greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. However, a purely Realist approach lacks 
nuance and presents an overly unproblematised view RI-DSDQ¶VEHKDYLRXU)RUH[DPSle, 
Japan has been conflicted even in its support for its own initiatives like the MEF and this 
requires explanation. 
 
$WWKHKHDUWRI-DSDQ¶VUHVSRQVHLVDQLPSXOVHEDVHGRQWKHQRUPVRI internationalism and 
$VLDQLVPEXWDOVR-DSDQ¶VVHOI-perception of its status in the international system. In this light, 
the Japanese government has been committed to ensuring the success of GX summitry and to 
this end hosting successful summits. This can be seen not only in the various grades awarded 
by the G8 Research Group to Japan-hosted summit, but also in ƿKLUD¶VVSHHFKWRWKH'LHWDW
the beginning of 1979, the year Japan hosted the first Tokyo Summit, which demonstrated the 
lengths the Japanese hosts would go to in order to ensure a successful summit: 
 
It is most significant that the summit meeting of major industrialized countries will be held in 
Japan this year for the first time in Asia. This meeting is a very important forum for the 
leaders of the nations concerned to discuss frankly their policies and to seek international 
cooperation for the stable expansion of the world economy. We intend to do our utmost as 
host country in preparation for this meeting and to work with the other participating countries 
IRULWVVXFFHVVƿKLUD 
 
This commitment has continued through to the present day and it ap- SHDUVWKDW-DSDQ¶V
EHKDYLRXUIDOOVZLWKLQWKH(QJOLVK6FKRRO¶VSDUWLFXODU GHILQLWLRQRIµJUHDWSRZHU¶VWDWXV7R
quote Morris (2011, pp. 328-329) and KLVWUHDWPHQWRI+HGOH\%XOO¶VZRUNJreat powers 
 
are not just unusually powerful states, but collectively constitute an institution of 
international society. Accordingly, great powers must conform to certain behavioural 
expectations and in particular must «manage their relationships with one another in 
the interests of international order». (Bull 1977, p. 202) 
 
,Q%XOO¶VFODVVLFIRUPXODWLRQJUHDWSRZHUVKDYH©DVSHFLDOPLVVLRQ>DV@ custodian[s] or 
trustees[s] of the interests of international society» and are required to «accept the duty, and 
are thought by others to have the duty, of modifying their policies in the light of the 
managerial responsibilities they bear» (Bull 1977, p. 202). 
 
,QRWKHUZRUGVE\SOD\LQJDQXPEHURIµUHFRJQLWLRQJDPHV¶XVXDOO\ played by rising powers 
to assert their increasing influence) that seek to reinforce its status as a great power of the day, 
Japan has exhibited the sense of responsibility that the English School identifies as one of the 
defining qualities of great power status. Even if it is evidently a great power in relative 
decline, certain responsibilities remain that are constitutive of this status and thereby shape 
behaviour. To risk banality for a moment, this is the Spiderman adage that «with great power 
comes great responsibil- ity». The Japanese government has demonstrated a belief that it 
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should act QRWRQO\DVD*UHDW3RZHUEXWDOVRDVDµ*UHDW5HVSRQVLEOH¶0RUULV p. 329, 
in reference to the coalition government led by UK prime minister David Cameron). 
 
However, this internationalist impulse has come directly into conflict with the hard-nosed 
Realism outlined above. The result has been contradictory and unpredictable behaviour at 
times over recent years and even paralysis on other occasions. For example, Japan has 
worked for the success of new mechanisms of global governance such as the G20 and 
demonstrates innovation in creating bodies such as the MEF. However, its enthusiasm has 
clear limits: the success of these new and more representative bodies should never be at the 
expensHRI-DSDQ¶VSUHIHUUHGFHQWUDO mechanism of global governance, the G8. This has 
resulted in a more qualiILHGLQWHUQDWLRQDOLVPWKDQKDVWUDGLWLRQDOO\EHHQRQGLVSOD\LQ-DSDQ¶V
G8 summitry. The strategy by which successive Japanese governments have recently sought 
to pursue these apparently contradictory objectives has been to stress the democratic values at 
the heart of the declaration that came out of the first Rambouillet Summit, and which are so 
much harder to discern in the G20. Although for a time this strategy dovetailed nicely with 
SULPHPLQLVWHU$Vǀ7DUǀ¶VYDOXHV-oriented diplomacy, it has generally been regarded as a 
hollow and retrograde approach. Equally, a surprising lack of  coordination between 
policymakers has come to the fore on occasion, one example being prime minister Kan 
1DRWR¶VLGHDRILQYLWLQJ&KLQDWRIXWXUH G8 summits mooted at the 2010 G8 Summit without 
prior consultation with MOFA officials (Dobson 2012a). 
 
These are dilemmas that Japanese leaders have struggled to overcome not only in the way 
they manage the changing world order and the institutional architecture of global governance 
but also in terms of the global issues with which they grapple. However, the return to power 
of the Liberal Democratic Party in December 2012 suggests a possible resolution of this 
impasse, although not one that ardent supporters of global governance might welcome. Since 
returning to power prime minister Abe has demonstrated a more coherent approach to the 
mechanisms of global governance than his DPJ predecessors. With one eye on the domestic 
reception, he has explicitly and consistently used these mechanisms to promote and 
secure international support for his three-pronged economic policies popularly known as 
«Abenomics» as well as his more robust (some would say µQDWLRQDOLVWLF¶ZKHUHDVVRPH
ZRXOGVD\µQRUPDO¶LQLWLDWLYHVLQIRUHLJQ and security policy. The resulting behaviour across 
the calendar of global governance from the World Economic Forum in January through to the 
UN General Assembly in September is certainly more joined up, strategic even. However, it 
focuses on national interest to the exclusion of any vision of global governance, normative 
impulse or sense of leadership that have previously been the hallmark of Japanese 
participation in global summitry 'REVRQ$V$EH¶VSRVLWLRQDSSHDUVWREHUHODWLYH
secure with no up-coming election or intra-party threat, more of the same is to be expected. 
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